Applying Double Standards to Offensive Beliefs
On Critical Social Justice theory and Sesardić’s conjecture
We should be glad that most people are comfortable going along to get along; without some degree of social conformity, our society could not function properly. The downside is that people lose their willingness to do the right thing and speak the truth. People are so dishonest about their beliefs and behavior that researchers can’t expect good results from their survey questions on sensitive topics. This pervasive issue with survey data is known as social-desirability bias; simply put, it’s when people don’t say the truth when the truth sounds bad.
Social-desirability bias isn’t limited to social surveys. It’s obvious that politicians will exaggerate and lie when it makes them look good. Job applicants feign enthusiasm for working at boring jobs because they know it will increase their chances of an offer. Students write application essays to elite colleges that profess a desire to change the world when they actually want to appease their parents. And nobody wants to tell their friend that they look bad with their new haircut. Social pressure impedes our ability to determine the truth.
The harsher the social penalty, the worse the bias. Our present culture is heavily influenced by Critical Social Justice theory. Attitudes deemed racist, sexist, homophobic, or transphobic can land you on the wrong side of a vindictive Twitter mob. This small but intolerant minority disproportionately influences our culture and institutions. Although rare, a single Facebook comment or innocuous remark can result in extremely negative social and career consequences. People see these cancellations for seemingly innocuous behavior and become fearful of upsetting anyone. As the mob wants, there is often so little to gain and so much to lose from dissenting from the orthodoxy.
It’s deemed okay to cause reputational damage to dissenters because they are bad people who deserve it. A single comment is sufficient evidence of wickedness. This tendency to think the worst of your political opponent is exacerbated by selection bias. Rather than using data, people formulate their conceptions about groups based on personal interactions and peer opinion. Since CSJ advocates are frequently combative and hostile, disagreeing with them is very unpleasant. And since they like to cancel people, the type of people that engage with them care little about their reputation or are too naïve to understand the risk. There are some brave and intelligent dissenters, but they are in short supply.
The anonymity of the internet allows reputation-conscious individuals to provide their substantive critiques, but CSJ advocates are known for self-isolating by blocking people who criticize them. Social media websites already engage in censorship of so-called dangerous ideas. When dissenters are forced onto other platforms dedicated to free speech, they find themselves in the company of some very unpleasant people. The fact that they are around these people serves as reinforcing evidence that they are unpleasant themselves. The onus is on the dissenter to demonstrate that he isn’t a nasty bigot, while all avenues such as “I have friends of other races” are closed off.
When conversations with Critical Social Justice advocates and dissenters do take place, they are often not particularly productive. Tangential conversations about hidden motives are frequent, and typically non-controversial premises are scrutinized. The politically incorrect belief is held to a different empirical standard; rather than merely having to demonstrate that the politically incorrect view is more probable, you must show that it’s true beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather than entirely basing beliefs on evidence, you must also incorporate social justice considerations.
Even if you can demonstrate a claim beyond a doubt, there are some frustrating responses you’re likely to hear. If you have in-depth knowledge of one of the taboo subjects, CSJ advocates will question your intentions; they’ll ask why your care so much or insists that you have hidden motivations. This is sometimes insinuated using loaded language; while ordinary people have passions and interests, dissenters have “obsessions” and “fetishes.”
Philosopher Neven Sesardić has discussed the implications of using epithets and holding undesirable views to a higher standard. Researcher Emil Kirkegaard has coined the term Sesardić’s Conjecture to describe the effect of ideological concerns increasing scientific rigor for politically incorrect claims and reducing it for politically correct claims. In his book Making Sense of Heritability, Sesardić explains this phenomenon:
On the less obvious side, a nasty campaign against H could have the unintended effect of strengthening H epistemically, and making the criticism of H look less convincing. Simply, if you happen to believe that H is true and if you also know that opponents of H will be strongly tempted to “play dirty,” that they will be eager to seize upon your smallest mistake, blow it out of all proportion, and label you with Dennett’s “good epithets,” with a number of personal attacks thrown in for good measure, then if you still want to advocate H, you will surely take extreme care to present your argument in the strongest possible form. In the inhospitable environment for your views, you will be aware that any major error is a liability that you can hardly afford, because it will more likely be regarded as a reflection of your sinister political intentions than as a sign of your fallibility. The last thing one wants in this situation is the disastrous combination of being politically denounced (say, as a “racist”) and being proved to be seriously wrong about science. Therefore, in the attempt to make themselves as little vulnerable as possible to attacks they can expect from their uncharitable and strident critics, those who defend H will tread very cautiously and try to build a very solid case before committing themselves publicly. As a result, the quality of their argument will tend to rise, if the subject matter allows it.
It is different with those who attack H. They are regarded as being on the “right” side (in the moral sense), and the arguments they offer will typically get a fair hearing, sometimes probably even a hearing that is “too fair.” Many a potential critic will feel that, despite seeing some weaknesses in their arguments, he doesn’t really want to point them out publicly or make much of them because this way, he might reason, he would just play into the hands of “racists” and “right-wing ideologues” that he and most of his colleagues abhor. Consequently, someone who opposes H can expect to be rewarded with being patted on the back for a good political attitude, while his possible cognitive errors will go unnoticed or unmentioned or at most mildly criticized.
Now, given that an advocate of H and an opponent of H find themselves in such different positions, who of the two will have more incentive to invest a lot of time and hard work to present the strongest possible defense of his views? The question answers itself. In the academic jungle, as elsewhere, it is the one who anticipates trouble who will spare no effort to be maximally prepared for the confrontation.
If I am right, the pressure of political correctness would thus tend to result, ironically, in politically incorrect theories becoming better developed, more carefully articulated, and more successful in coping with objections. On the other hand, I would predict that a theory with a lot of political support would typically have a number of scholars flocking to its defense with poorly thought out arguments and with speedily generated but fallacious “refutations” of the opposing view. This would explain why, as Ronald Fisher said, “the best causes tend to attract to their support the worst arguments” (Fisher 1959: 31).
Within CSJ communities, people are not only held to lower empirical standards—they are held to exceptionally high ideological standards. Their communities are prone to ideological purity tests and one-upmanship; some remark that “the left eats its own.” This doesn’t have the effect of acting as a check on the community. On the contrary, it reinforces the ideological commitments of the community and its confidence in those commitments. This is made even worse by the operating assumption of guilt by association. Platforming and associating with bad people is looked down upon and calls into question the platformer’s commitments to social justice. The result is that CSJ communities become self-righteous, insular, and poorly equipped to engage in serious debate.
It’s not surprising that CSJ advocates are less willing to actually have debates and conversations with their ideological opponents. Unpersuasive theories that lack empirical support need other means of enforcing ideological conformity like censorship. The low empirical standards result in intellectuals and advocates who aren’t intellectually impressive. It’s hard to be a convincing interlocutor without training in debate, entertaining opposing ideas in your mind, and conceding premises when they’re false. Yet those who do this are often regarded as not ideologically pure and get harsh pushback, resulting in self-selection out of these communities.
This environment of low intellectual standards made possible the grievance studies affair in which James Lindsay, Helen Pluckrose, and Peter Boghossian were able to publish bogus articles in Critical Social Justice fields such as queer and fat studies. This was an embarrassment to these disciplines and made the public aware of these strange ideologies. Piece by piece, the authority of the CSJ theorists and advocates will be chipped away, but the tricky part will be getting rid of the legal and academic bolstering for these ideologies. If we’re somehow able to do that, I don’t see them persisting for long.
Inspiration for the title came from this: http://www1.udel.edu/educ/gottfredson/reprints/2007doublestandards.pdf